















“Achievable Outcomes of Dynamic Contribution Games” 
Second Version 
 
PIER Working Paper 11-016 
Penn Institute for Economic Research
Department of Economics 
University of Pennsylvania 
3718 Locust Walk 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 
pier@econ.upenn.edu 





This paper concerns multistage games, with and without discounting, in which each
player can increase the level of an action over time so as to increase the other players’
future payoffs. An action proﬁle is achievable if it is the limit point of a subgame perfect
equilibrium path. Necessary conditions are derived for achievability under relatively gen-
eral conditions. They imply that any efﬁcient proﬁle that is approximately achievable must
be in the core of the underlying coalitional game. In some but not all games with discount-
ing, the necessary conditions for achievability are also sufﬁcient for a proﬁle to be the limit
of achievable proﬁles as the period length shrinks to zero. Consequently, in these games
when the period length is very short, (i) the set of achievable proﬁles does not depend on
the move structure; (ii) an efﬁcient proﬁle can be approximately achieved if and only if it
is in the core; and (iii) any achievable proﬁle can be achieved almost instantly.
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A dynamic contribution game is deﬁned broadly here to be a multiperiod game in which each
player can increase the level of an action incrementally, thereby increasing the other players’
future payoffs. Such games exhibit positive spillovers that do not diminish with time. A leading
application is one in which the actions are cumulative contributions of a private good to the
production of a durable public good. The game is then a model of a fund drive, or sequence of
fund drives, such as those held to ﬁnance church or university building projects or public radio
programs.1 Another application is to adoption and entry: agents decide when to invest in a new
technology, and the future returns from adoption increase as the number of adopters grows.2
Another application is to holdup: a seller and buyer make pre-trade investments over time in
an asset’s quality, and perhaps periodic payments to each other.3 Yet another is to partnership:
partners contribute effort over time in order to increase a common capital stock.
Some dynamic contribution games have unique equilibria that can be characterized by back-
wards induction. For example, this is true in Admati and Perry (1991) and Compte and Jehiel
(2003) because of their restriction to a binary public good – backward induction starts in the
period in which the threshold provision point is reached. If instead the payoff functions are
smooth, backwards induction generally cannot be used and multiple equilibria exist. Results in
this case have been fragmentary. Typically, for example, the existence of an equilibrium that
achieves an (approximately) efﬁcient outcome is established by construction, as in Marx and
Matthews (2000), Lockwood and Thomas (2002), and Pitchford and Snyder (2004), without a
systematic exploration of other equilibria.
The goal of this paper is to characterize as fully as possible the set of equilibrium outcomes
of a range of dynamic contribution games. Even the size of this set of outcomes is an issue.
As in a repeated game, it might be large because current deviations may by severely punished
by triggering a decrease in the future contributions of the other players.4 On the other hand, it
might be small because the ability to punish deviations is diminished once sunk contributions
1Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), Admati and Perry (1991), Marx and Matthews
(2000), Compte and Jehiel (2003), Yildirim (2006), Duffy, Ochs, and Vesterlund (2007), and Battaglini, Nunnari,
and Palfrey (2010) study dynamic contribution games to fund a public project.
2Gale (1995), Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2008), and Ochs and Park (2010) study dynamic adoption games.
3Pitchford and Snyder (2004) and Che and Sakovics (2004) study dynamic holdup games.
4The folk theorem of Dutta (1995) for stochastic games does not apply to the games of this paper because they do
not satisfy its “asymptotic state independence” assumptions, (A1) and (A2). Indeed, we shall see that a folk theorem
does not hold for them.
1have become large. This effect of prior actions on security payoffs is not present in a repeated
game, and it can result in “strategic gradualism,” the property that contributions must be raised
slowly over time in equilibrium.5
Overview of the Model and Results
A player’s action/contribution in the games to be studied is a nonnegative real number that can
be raised in any period in which the player can move. The only maintained assumption on the
move structure is that each player can move in an inﬁnite number of periods. Payoffs are given
by either a discounted sum of stage game payoffs or, in the no-discounting case, by the lower
limit of the sequence of stage game payoffs. Payoffs exhibit a weak positive spillovers property,
and may have discontinuities due to the presence of thresholds in the provision of discrete public
goods. All past actions are observable.
Every pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium generates a convergent path of contribu-
tion proﬁles. The proﬁle to which the path converges is said to be achieved by the equilibrium.
The ﬁrst set of results consists of necessary conditions that equilibrium paths and achievable
proﬁles must satisfy.
The most novel necessary condition is that any achievable proﬁle must be in a particular set,
the undercore. Its deﬁnition is similar to that of the core, and does not depend on the dynamic
structure of the game. A proﬁle x is said to be underblocked by a coalition of players if there
exists a smaller proﬁle z ￿ x that prescribes zero contributions for the non-coalition players,
and that each coalition member i prefers to x once she raises zi to the level she most prefers,
holding z￿i ﬁxed. A satiation proﬁle is preferred by each player to any other proﬁle obtained
by raising just her contribution. The undercore is then the set of satiation proﬁles that are not
underblocked. Theorem 1 establishes that all achievable proﬁles are in the undercore.
An interpretation of Theorem 1 is that an achievable proﬁle must satisfy a certain fairness
property: it must not require any coalition’s contribution to be too large. Proposition 1 estab-
lishes that the core, as typically deﬁned in similar settings (e.g., Foley (1970)), is precisely the
set of efﬁcient proﬁles in the undercore. Theorem 1 thus tells us that any efﬁcient proﬁle that is
not in the core is unachievable.
Theorem 2 establishes another necessary condition for achievability. In the discounting
case, if the stage game payoff functions are differentiable and satisfy a strict positive spillovers
property, then all achievable proﬁles are inefﬁcient. In these games a core proﬁle can at best be
5Strategic gradualism has been explored, e.g., in Marx and Matthews (2000), Lockwood and Thomas (2002),
and most generally in Compte and Jehiel (2004).
2the limit of achievable proﬁles as the discount factor converges to one.
In some games with discounting, many undercore and core proﬁles are neither achievable
nor limits of achievable proﬁles as the discount factor converges to one. This is dramatically
illustrated by the binary public good game of Compte and Jehiel (2003). This game has a unique
achievable proﬁle, given a sufﬁciently large discount factor, even though the undercore and core
are continua of proﬁles. However, all undercore proﬁles are achievable in the no-discounting
versionofthegame. Thus, insomegamesthesetofachievableproﬁlesexpandsdiscontinuously
at ￿ D 1.
Theorem 3 identiﬁes a familiar class of games in which this discontinuity is absent. In
these games the aggregate contribution determines a public good quantity, and each player’s
payoff is quasilinear in her own contribution and smooth and strictly concave in the public
good. Furthermore, a prisoners’ dilemma (PD) property holds: starting from any proﬁle, not
raising her contribution further is each player’s dominant strategy in the stage game. Lastly,
the move structure is assumed to satisfy a weak cyclicity property which is satisﬁed by all
commonly assumed move structures, such as the simultaneous and round robin ones. Under
these assumptions, Theorem 3 shows that any neighborhood of any undercore proﬁle contains
a proﬁle that is achievable if the discount factor is sufﬁciently large. The undercore is thus
equal to both the closure of the set of proﬁles that are achievable for some ￿ < 1; and to the
closure of the set of proﬁles that are achievable for ￿ D 1: Since the deﬁnition of the undercore
is independent of the move structure, this result implies that in this class of games, the limiting
set of achievable proﬁles is independent of the move structure.
The proof of Theorem 3 shows that any neighborhood of almost any undercore proﬁle con-
tains the limit of a sequence of proﬁles that is an equilibrium path for all large discount factors.
Thus, if the period length is small, it takes very little actual time for the path of contributions to
reach any neighborhood of the proﬁle being achieved. Strategic gradualism may be necessary
in the sense that contributions cannot be raised to the ultimate goal in a ﬁnite number of periods,
but it is not necessary in the sense that it must take a long time to approximately reach the goal.
The ﬁnal result is Corollary 2, which derives three implications of the previous results for
equilibrium payoffs. The ﬁrst one is that any equilibrium payoff is weakly Pareto dominated
by an undercore payoff. The second is that any equilibrium payoff that is efﬁcient must be the
payoff generated by a core proﬁle. The third implication is that under the conditions of Theorem
3, any neighborhood of an undercore (and hence core) payoff contains an equilibrium payoff.
3Related Literature
Gale (2001) studies dynamic contribution games in which the players do not discount. These
games differ from those of this paper in that the stage-game payoff functions are assumed to be
continuous and the actions multidimensional. The main result, Theorem 1, is that a proﬁle is
achievable if and only if it is “approachable”, i.e., it is the limit of a feasible path of proﬁles and
gives each player at least as large a payoff as she can obtain on her own starting from any point
on the path. Two lemmas in the present paper extend Gale’s result to cases with discounting
and discontinuous payoffs. Lemma 2 shows that approachability is necessary for achievability,
and Lemma 5 shows that a generalization of approachability is sufﬁcient for achievability if the
prisoners’ dilemma property holds.
Gale (2001) also has a sufﬁcient condition for a proﬁle to be achievable that does not refer
to a path: any “strongly minimal positive satiation point” is achievable. Proposition 4 of this
paper establishes conditions under which the same is true in the discounting case as the discount
factor goes to one.
Also related is Lockwood and Thomas (2002), which considers two-player games with dis-
counting and continuous symmetric payoff functions satisfying the prisoners’ dilemma prop-
erty. When payoffs are differentiable, the proﬁle achieved by the most efﬁcient symmetric
equilibrium is shown to be inefﬁciently small. Our Theorem 2 generalizes this result to any
equilibrium, multiple players, and non-symmetric payoff functions. Lockwood and Thomas
(2002) also show, in the differentiable case, that the most efﬁcient symmetric equilibrium out-
come converges to the symmetric efﬁcient outcome as the discount factor goes to one, whether
the players move simultaneously or alternately. (Pitchford and Snyder (2004) obtain a similar
result.) This is a small hint of Corollary 2 .iii/; that under the conditions of Theorem 3, any
core payoff is the limit of equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor goes to one, regardless
(almost) of the move structure.
Lastly, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) is somewhat related. It describes a mechanism that
fully implements the core in a discrete public good setting, via a reﬁnement of subgame perfect
equilibrium. The mechanism is similar to the dynamic contribution games studied here, except
that it refunds the contributions each period that exceed the largest threshold point reached so
far, and it stops the game in the ﬁrst period in which the next threshold is not reached.
Organization
The model is set out in Section 2. Examples that motivate the questions and results are col-
lected in Section 3. Necessary conditions for a path to be an equilibrium path and for a proﬁle
4to be achievable are derived in Section 4. The structure of the undercore and core are delin-
eated in Section 5. Sufﬁcient conditions for a proﬁle to be achievable are derived in Section 6.
Implications for equilibrium payoffs are in Section 7, and concluding comments in Section 8.
Appendices A￿D contains proofs missing from Sections 4 ￿ 7; respectively.
2. Model
The set of players is N D f1;:::;ng; with n ￿ 2: At each date t D 1;2;:::; player i chooses
a number, xt
i 2 RC. For concreteness, we refer to xt
i as the player’s (cumulative) contribution.
The contribution proﬁle chosen in period t is denoted xt: A path, E x D fxtg1
tD0; is a sequence
starting with x0 D .0;:::;0/: Past actions are publicly observed.
The game satisﬁes a monotonicity property: for t ￿ 1 and any previously chosen xt￿1; the
players in period t can only choose a proﬁle xt for which xt ￿ xt￿1 holds.6
The move structure is a sequence of subsets of players, E N D fNtg1
tD1. Only players in Nt
can raise their contributions in period t: The move structure is assumed to satisfy [￿￿tN￿ D N
for all t ￿ 1; so that each player is able to move inﬁnitely often. A path is feasible if it is
nondecreasing and satisﬁes xt
i D x
t￿1
i for all t ￿ 1 and i = 2 Nt.
The stage-game payoff function is u : Rn
C ! Rn: Both discounting and no-discounting
cases are considered. In the discounting case, a path E x generates a continuation payoff in period
t that is the usual weighted average of present and future stage-game payoffs:




where ￿ 2 .0;1/ is the common discount factor. In the no-discounting .￿ D 1/ case, payoffs are
given by
Ut.E x;1/ :D lim inf
s!1u.xs/: (2)
Payoffs for the game as a whole are denoted without a superscript: U.E x;￿/ :D U1.E x;￿/: If the
discount factor is not explicitly mentioned in a result, the result holds for all ￿ 2 .0;1]:
The maintained assumptions about u begin with it taking the form
u.x/ D O u. f .X/;x/;
where X D
P
i2N xi is the aggregate contribution, O u : R
nC1
C ! Rn, and f : RC ! RC.
An interpretation is that f is a production function that uses the aggregate X to produce an
amount y D f .X/ of a public good that may have threshold provision points. Accordingly, f
6Here, x ￿ x0 means xi ￿ x0
i for all iI x > x0 means x 6D x0 and x ￿ x0I and x ￿ x0 means xi > x0
i for all i:
5is assumed to be nondecreasing and right continuous. Refer to a proﬁle that has an aggregate at
which f is discontinuous as a threshold proﬁle.
The function O u is assumed to be continuous, with each O ui.y;xi;x￿i/ strictly increasing in
y and strictly decreasing in xi: (These assumptions, together with f nondecreasing and right
continuous, imply that ui is upper semicontinuous.) In general O ui may increase or decrease in
x￿i; representing positive or negative direct externalities. However, the sum of the direct and
indirect (via y D f .X// effects is assumed to be nonnegative, and hence u satisﬁes a weak
positive spillovers property:
(PS) ui.￿/ is nondecreasing in x j; for all i 6D j 2 N:
A proﬁle x 2 Rn
C is efﬁcient if no z 2 Rn
C satisfying u.z/ > u.x/ exists. The origin, x D 0;
is assumed to be inefﬁcient. For convenience we make the mild assumption that u.x/ 6D u.O x/
for any two efﬁcient proﬁles x and O x:
Lastly, in order to insure that best replies exist and equilibrium paths converge, u is taken to
satisfy a mild boundedness assumption:
(BA) for any unbounded fxkg1
kD1 ￿ Rn
C; ui.x1/ > lim
k!1
supui.xk/ for some i 2 N:
The assumptions made so far are maintained throughout the paper. The resulting extensive
form game is denoted as 0.￿; E N/:
At times attention shall be restricted to payoffs that arise in a public good setting in which
direct externalities are absent, i.e., O ui.y;xi;x￿i/ does not actually depend on x￿i: Two such
settings that are of particular interest are the following:
￿ Binary setting. For all i 2 N; ui.x/ D 0 if X < X￿; and ui.x/ D Vi if X ￿ X￿; where
X￿ is a threshold provision point. When referring to this setting, 0 < Vi < X￿ for each i;
and 0 < X￿ <
P
i Vi; shall always be assumed.
￿ Neoclassical setting. For all i 2 N; ui.x/ D vi.X/ ￿ xi; where the valuation function
vi satisﬁes vi.0/ D 0 and is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly











shall always be assumed. Both (BA) and (PS) hold in this setting, the latter strictly.7





Xk ! ￿1 as k ! 1: Hence, i exists such that ui.xk/ ! ￿1; and so ui.x1/ > lim
s!1
supui.xs/:
6A range of timing and economic scenarios give rise to games with the formal structure of
0.￿; E N/: The following three are illustrative.
Scenario 1: Random Terminal Date
In this scenario the game ends at a random date Q T; where Pr. Q T D T/ D .1 ￿ ￿/￿T￿1:
Consumption occurs only at the terminal date. At date t a player’s expected continuation payoff
is
P
s￿t Pr. Q T D sj Q T ￿ t/u.xs/; which is precisely as shown in (1). This scenario arises by
allowing the players of the static normal form game deﬁned by u to raise their actions incre-
mentally period by period, subject to the speciﬁed random stopping rule that determines when
the payoffs will be realized.
Scenario 2: Endogenous Terminal Date
In this scenario the terminal date is determined by the history of play. A preeminent ex-
ample is contribution to a binary public project by impatient players, studied by, e.g., Admati
and Perry (1991) and Compte and Jehiel (2003). The project is completed once the aggregate




i ; when it is made in period t. A path E x that completes the


















where vi.X/ D Vi1fX￿X￿g: This yields our binary setting.8
An equivalent formulation is for the project to generate a ﬂow of beneﬁts, .1 ￿ ￿/Vi per
period, subsequent to completion, rather than the one-period beneﬁt Vi upon completion. This
brings us to the next scenario.
Scenario 3: Public Capital
Contributions in this scenario become the non-depreciating capital of one or more projects
thatproduceaﬂowoffuturebeneﬁtsovertheinﬁnitefuture. Forexample, supposecontributions




which is instantly converted into capital on a one-to-one basis. So xt is the vector of capital
available to produce beneﬁts in the time interval [t1;.t C 1/1/. Player i values these beneﬁts
at rate O vi.xt/: The players discount payoffs at rate r > 0; and their discount factor is ￿ D e￿r1:
8In Admati and Perry (1991) the cost of contributing xs
i ￿ xs￿1






; where wi is
strictly convex. This convexity generates a non-incentive reason for contributions to be made incrementally. Only if
wi is linear is the Admati-Perry game of the form 0.￿; E N/:





















This payoff is as in (1), with ui.x/ D vi.xs/ ￿ xs
i ; less the constant (at time t/ x
t￿1
i :
Another application within this scenario is to relational contracting in a ﬁrm.9 Suppose
player 1 owns a ﬁrm and players i > 1 are the workers. Each worker chooses a non-contractible
effort level each period. The quality of the ﬁrm’s productive assets in a period increases in the
cumulation of the workers’ prior efforts. The rate of ﬂow of revenue in period t to the owner
is thus an increasing function of the workers’ cumulative efforts, O v1.xt




1 in period t: The owner’s continuation payoff is then as shown in (4),
with vi.xs/ D r￿1O v1.xs
￿1/: A worker’s stage-game payoff in a period is a share ￿i 2 [0;1]
of the wages paid in that period, less the effort she takes. (The shares ￿i sum to one, and are



























If a scenario like this is the one of interest, it is important to interpret ￿ ! 1 as taking the
period length rather than the discount rate to zero, since vi D r￿1O vi: If r were taken to zero, the
present value of future beneﬁts would go to inﬁnity and the free rider problem would vanish.
3. Equilibrium Examples
In this paper, an unmodiﬁed “equilibrium” always denotes a pure strategy subgame perfect equi-
librium. Refer to the outcome of an equilibrium is an equilibrium path. A proﬁle is achievable
if it is the limit of an equilibrium path. The examples of this section are intended to motivate
and illustrate upcoming results and arguments.
Example 1. Binary Threshold
Consider the binary setting with two players and V1 < V2: The efﬁcient individually rational
proﬁles satisfy X D X￿ and xi ￿ Vi: Let the move structure be the alternating one in which
only player 1 .2/ is able to move in odd (even) numbered periods.
9This is somewhat similar to the hold-up model of Pitchford and Snyder (2004), although the discounting there
is the result of a random terminal date as in the ﬁrst scenario described above.
8Whetherthereisdiscountingmakesaradicaldifferenceinthisexample. Intheno-discounting
case, any efﬁcient individually rational proﬁle is achievable. For instance, let x be such a pro-
ﬁle, and deﬁne a Markovian strategy proﬁle as follows: if player i can move in period t, she
plays xt







2 if Xt￿1 2 [0;x1]







0 if Xt￿1 = 2 [x1; X￿]
X￿ ￿ x
t￿1
1 if Xt￿1 2 [x1; X￿]
:
These strategies are characterized by two contribution goals. Player 1 is responsible for bringing
the aggregate from 0 up to the ﬁrst goal, x1; and until she does so player 2 does nothing.
Player 2 is then responsible for bringing the aggregate up to the second and ﬁnal goal, X￿: The
equilibrium path is x1 D .x1;0/ and xt D x for t > 1.10
In stark contrast, the discounting game with a sufﬁciently large ￿ has a unique equilibrium,
the one just described with x D .X￿￿V2;V2/: This is the result of Compte and Jehiel (2003).11
The set of achievable proﬁles in this binary setting thus expands discontinuously at ￿ D 1.
Remark 1. This discontinuity can even occur if payoffs are continuous. Suppose ui.x/ D
vi.X/ ￿ xi; where vi.X/ D Vi ￿ Vi
p
1 ￿ .X=X￿/ for X ￿ X￿; and vi.X/ D Vi for X > X￿.
The extreme nonconcavity at X￿ acts like a threshold. An argument like that of Compte and
Jehiel (2003) shows that the game has a unique equilibrium if ￿ is large enough, V1 < V2 < X￿;
and .V1/2=X￿ C V2 > X￿.
Example 2. Gradualism
Consider a two-player game in a neoclassical setting, with each v0
i < 1 and the alternating move
structure. Under these assumptions, in the no-discounting case, any x satisfying individual
rationality, xi ￿ vi.X/; and no over-production, v0
1.X/Cv0
2.X/ ￿ 1; is achievable. This closed
10Note that ￿ gives a payoff of 0 to player 1 if x D .V1; X￿ ￿ V1/; and a payoff of 0 to player 2 if x D
.X￿ ￿ V2;V2/: A strategy proﬁle that requires both players to contribute zero and punishes any unilateral deviation
by the play of the appropriate one of these punishing equilibria is thus an equilibrium that achieves x D 0:
11If ￿ < 1; the strategy ￿ deﬁned by (5) for any efﬁcient individually rational x with x2 < V2 is not subgame
perfect. For, in a subgame starting in an even period t and xt￿1 D .x1 ￿ ";0/; player 2 would deviate by raising










Figure 1 (b). An equilibrium path that








Figure 1 (a). The closed shaded region
is the set of achievable profiles if d = 1.
YN
YN
set of proﬁles is the shaded region in Figure 1 (a). (The labelings will be explained later.) Any
feasible individually rational payoff is thus an equilibrium payoff of this game.
For instance, consider the efﬁcient individually rational proﬁle shown in Figure 1 (b). The
shaded region is the set of all proﬁles below x that are worse for both players than x: It con-
tains the origin because x is individually rational. The indicated path E x converges to x: It is
constructed by ﬁrst having player 1 raise her contribution enough so that the resulting proﬁle,
x1 D .x1
1;0/; gives player 2 the payoff u2.x/: Then player 2 raises hers enough to give player 1
the payoff u1.x/; and so on. The trigger strategy proﬁle in which any deviation from this path
triggers the play of the passive strategies, which are those that call for each player to never raise
her contribution after any history, is an equilibrium when ￿ D 1. Obviously, no player can gain
by deviating from the path. Off the path, the passive strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium because
neither player can gain by unilaterally raising her contribution.12
Any equilibrium path that achieves the x of Figure 1 (b) must exhibit gradualism in the
sense that it achieves x only asymptotically. Neither player can increase her contribution too
much in any period because doing so would result in a proﬁle that the other player prefers to
x, and thus that player could proﬁtably deviate by never raising her contribution again. Any
equilibrium path achieving x must therefore stay in the shaded region, ensuring gradualism.
Note, however, that this gradualism has no welfare cost because of the lack of discounting.
In contrast to the binary Example 1, discounting creates no discontinuity in this neoclassical
12The equilibrum path in Figure 1 (b) is also generated by a Markov perfect equilibrium, a contribution goal
equilibrium deﬁned as in (5) but with an inﬁnite sequence of goals.
10example. As shall be shown, discounting shrinks the set of achievable proﬁles in a continuous
way – there is no discontinuity at ￿ D 1: While no efﬁcient proﬁle is achievable if ￿ < 1; every
neighborhood of an individually rational efﬁcient proﬁle contains an achievable proﬁle if ￿ is
sufﬁciently large.
Example 3. No Folk Theorem
The previous example suggests that under its payoff assumptions, any individually rational
payoff vector should be achievable if ￿ D 1; and be the limit of achievable payoff vectors as
￿ ! 1: This conjecture is false, however, if the number of players is larger than two.
To construct a counterexample, let n D 3 and vi.X/ D 1 ￿ .X C 1/￿1. Note that the maxi-
mizer of v1.Y/ C v2.Y/ ￿ Y is Yf1;2g :D
p
2 ￿ 1: Let x be any efﬁcient and strictly individually
rational proﬁle satisfying x3 D 0 and X > Yf1;2g.13 We claim x is unachievable. To prove
this, suppose E x is an equilibrium path achieving x: If Xt￿1 < Xt D X for some t < 1; then a
player i for whom x
t￿1
i < xt
i would gain by not raising her contribution in period t or thereafter:





i ;x￿i/; and this
exceeds her continuation payoff of ui.x/ from not deviating because v0
i < 1: The convergence
is therefore asymptotic. This implies that for some t; Yf1;2g < Xt < X: The deﬁnition of Yf1;2g
and strict concavity imply that
u1.xt/ C u2.xt/ D v1.Xt/ C v2.Xt/ ￿ Xt
> v1.X/ C v2.X/ ￿ X D u1.x/ C u2.x/:
We conclude that ui.xt/ > ui.x/ for some i 2 f1;2g. Fixing this i and letting x￿ be the
largest maximizer of ui in the set fxsg; we have ui.x￿/ > ui.xs/ for all s > ￿. Therefore, the
continuation payoff of player i in period ￿ C 1 if she deviates by never raising her contribution
again, which is at least ui.x￿/; exceeds her continuation payoff from not deviating. So E x cannot
be an equilibrium path.
The reason why x cannot be achieved in this example is that it speciﬁes an overly large
contribution from players 1 and 2. Because their joint contribution exceeds Yf1;2g and they are
the only ones contributing, they both could be made better off in an incentive-free world by
reducing their contributions. As we shall see, this is the condition which implies that given any
feasible path converging to x; at least one of these players can proﬁtably deviate. Which of
them it is depends upon the path, and so it is necessary to consider the coalition f1;2g of players
as the entity able to “block” x from being achieved.
13For example, x D .:5YN;:5YN;0/; for YN D
p
3 ￿ 1; is efﬁcient and strictly individually rational.
11This example has features that simplify the argument but are not required. Its generaliza-
tion in Theorem 1 below does not need x to be on the boundary, nor any ui to be concave or
continuous.
4. Necessary Conditions
General necessary conditions are derived in this section for a path to be an equilibrium path,
and for a proﬁle to be achievable. Their derivations require two deﬁnitions.
First, a player’s passive strategy is the strategy specifying that she not raise her contribution
after any history. It is obviously a feasible strategy in any subgame, regardless of the move
structure. Because of (PS), a player imposes the most severe punishment possible upon the
other players by playing her passive strategy.
Second, the security payoff function u￿ is deﬁned as
u￿





(Lemma A1 in Appendix A establishes that this program has a solution.) In a subgame that
starts from a proﬁle x; player i can obtain a continuation payoff of at least u￿
i .x/ by playing her
myopic best reply to x and passively thereafter. Note that u￿
i is nonincreasing in xi and, since
ui satisﬁes (PS), nondecreasing in x￿i.
Necessary Conditions for Equilibrium Paths
Consider an equilibrium that generates a path E x: Suppose player i deviates by playing O xi in
period t; and her passive strategy thereafter. Since the contributions of the other players in each
period s ￿ t can be no lower than xt
￿i, (PS) implies that following this deviation, player i’s
stage-game payoffs, and hence her continuation payoff, are no less than ui.O xi;xt
￿i/: This payoff
therefore must not exceed her equilibrium continuation payoff, Ut
i .E x;￿/. As this is true for any
O xi ￿ x
t￿1






i .E x;￿/ for all t ￿ 1; i 2 Nt: (7)
Another useful condition is obtained by considering an immediate deviation by player i
to her passive strategy in period t: This deviation is feasible even if i = 2 Nt; and it yields a
continuation payoff no less than ui.x
t￿1
i ;xt





i .E x;￿/ for all t ￿ 1; i 2 N: (8)
12The following lemma uses (8) and (BA) to show that equilibrium paths converge. It also
establishes that if an equilibrium path that does not converge in a ﬁnite number of periods, the
proﬁle it achieves is not a threshold. This is because once a path comes close to a threshold,
some player would want to deviate by raising her contribution enough to reach the threshold.
Lemma 1. Equilibrium paths converge. An equilibrium path that converges to a threshold
proﬁle does so in a ﬁnite number of periods.
We can now observe that in the no-discounting case, any continuation equilibrium payoff is
equal to the payoff generated by the proﬁle being achieved:
Ut.E x;1/ D u.x/ for all t ￿ 0: (9)
For, by Lemma 1, x is either a proﬁle at which u is continuous, or it is achieved in a ﬁnite
number of periods. In either case (9) follows from (2).
The path necessary conditions, (7) and (8), are used to prove the following lemma, which
establishes that conditions like (9) hold regardless of the discount factor.14
Lemma 2. If x is achieved by an equilibrium path E x; then
lim
t!1
Ut.E x;￿/ D lim
t!1
u.xt/ D u.x/: (10)
Furthermore, for all t > 0 and i 2 N;
maxfUt




￿i/g ￿ ui.x/: (11)
The next lemma is a simple consequence of (11). Suppose x is achieved by an equilibrium
path E x. Suppose also that a proﬁle z and a player i exist such that by some date all the other
players have raised their contributions above what z speciﬁes, but that at date ￿ ￿1 player i has
not. Then u￿
i .z/ ￿ ui.x/: If the opposite held, player i would want to deviate from the path at
date ￿:
Lemma 3. If x is achieved by an equilibrium path E x; then there does not exist a triple .z;i;￿/
that satisﬁes (a) u￿
i .z/ > ui.x/; (b) zi ￿ x
￿￿1
i ; and (c) z￿i ￿ x￿
￿i.
Proof. Since u￿










￿i/ > ui.x/, violating the necessary condi-
tion (11).




ui.x/ for every t and i 2 N: He shows, in the no-discounting case with a continuous u; that any achievable proﬁle is
approachable. The second statement in Lemma 2 generalizes this to the discounting case and to payoffs with some
discontinuities.
13Necessary Conditions for Achievable Proﬁles
We now seek necessary conditions for achievability that do not refer to a feasible path. Path-free
conditions are useful because they require less data to check. Furthermore, they do not depend
on the nature of the game’s move structure (except for its property that each player can move
inﬁnitely often).
Two necessary conditions are fairly obvious. Say that a proﬁle x is a satiation proﬁle if
u￿.x/ D u.x/; and that it is individually rational if u￿.0/ ￿ u.x/:
Lemma 4. Any achievable proﬁle is an individually rational satiation proﬁle.
We prove here in the text the necessity of individual rationality, as the proof is both simple
and an introduction to the more general argument used below. So, suppose x is a proﬁle for
which u￿
i .0/ > ui.x/ for some player i: Let ￿ be the ﬁrst period in which player i can move.
Then, with respect to any feasible path that converges to x; the triple .0;i;￿/ satisﬁes (a)-(c) of
Lemma 3. This proves x is unachievable. Essentially, behind the formality, player i can gain
be deviating as soon as possible from any path that converges to x, raising her contribution to
whatever maximizes ui.￿;x￿
￿i/ and then never raising it again.
We now formulate a condition more general than individual rationality that any achievable
proﬁle must satisfy. As the condition utilizes a concept related to that of “blocking” in cooper-
ative game theory, it is natural to adopt a similar terminology. Refer to a nonempty subset of
players as a coalition. Then, a proﬁle x is underblocked by a coalition S if z ￿ x exists such
that z￿S D 0 and u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.x/: This deﬁnition generalizes that of individual rationality, since
a proﬁle is individually rational if and only if it is not underblocked by a singleton coalition.15
Underblocked proﬁles are unachievable. The precise argument is given below in the proof
of Theorem 1, but here is the gist of it. Suppose x is underblocked, say by coalition S using
proﬁle z: Let E x be any feasible path converging to x: Let ￿ be the ﬁrst date at which xt exceeds
z: The deﬁnition of ￿ insures that zi ￿ x
￿￿1
i for some coalition member i 2 S: (Which coalition
member this is may depend on the path, unless S is a singleton). This construction yields a
triple, .z;i;￿/; satisfying (a)-(c) of Lemma 3. Thus, x is not achievable.
We have now two necessary conditions for achievability, being a satiation proﬁle and not
being underblocked. Deﬁne the undercore to be the set of satiation proﬁles that are not under-
blocked, and denote it as D: The following is our ﬁrst main result.
15If u￿
i .0/ > ui.x/; then fig underblocks x using z D 0: Conversely, if fig underblocks x using z; then z D
.zi;0￿i/; and so u￿
i .0/ ￿ u￿
i .z/ > ui.x/:
14Theorem 1. All achievable proﬁles are in the undercore.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let x be achievable. Then it is a satiation proﬁle. Assume x is under-
blocked. Hence, a coalition S and proﬁle z ￿ x exist such that z￿S D 0 and u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.x/:
For i 2 S we have u￿
i .xi;z￿i/ ￿ u￿
i .x/ D ui.x/; since z￿i ￿ x￿i and x is a satiation proﬁle.
This proves zi 6D xi; and so zS ￿ xS.
Let E x be an equilibrium path that achieves x: Since zS ￿ xS; a smallest date exists at which
xt
S is strictly larger than zS : there exist ￿ ￿ 1 and i 2 S such that
zi ￿ x
￿￿1
i and zS ￿ x￿
S: (12)
Observe that .z;i;￿/ satisﬁes the conditions of Lemma 3 with respect to E x: It satisﬁes u￿
i .z/ >
ui.x/ because i 2 S: It satisﬁes zi ￿ x
￿￿1
i by the ﬁrst part of (12). It satisﬁes z￿i ￿ x￿
￿i by
the second part of (12) and the fact that z￿S D 0 ￿ x￿
￿S: Lemma 3 thus implies that E x does not
achieve x, a contradiction. This proves x is not underblocked, and so x 2 D: ￿
The consequences of Theorem 1 are explored in the next section by examining the structure
of the undercore. We end this section with a ﬁnal necessary condition: in the discounting case,
every achievable proﬁle is inefﬁcient if the payoffs are continuously differentiable and satisfy
a strict version of (PS).16,17 Essentially, the sum of the player’s gains from deviating are ﬁrst
order in the remaining amount to contribute, but the sum of their time-average future beneﬁts
from not deviating is second order in this amount.
Theorem 2. Suppose ￿ < 1; and u is continuously differentiable and satisﬁes @ui.x/=@x j > 0
for all i 6D j: Then any achievable proﬁle is inefﬁcient.
5. The Undercore
TheundercorecontainsallachievableproﬁlesbyTheorem1and, asisshowninthenextsection,
the reverse inclusion holds in a limiting sense in some settings. Uncovering the structure of the
undercore will thus be useful for understanding the nature of achievable proﬁles. The ﬁrst
step is Lemma B1 in Appendix B, which shows that D is a compact set under the maintained
assumptions.
16Related results are obtained for special cases by Marx and Matthews (2000), Lockwood and Thomas (2002),
and Pitchford and Snyder (2004).
17Achievable proﬁles may be efﬁcient if payoffs are not differentiable, even if ￿ < 1. This is the case in Example
1 of Section 3, and in other exampes in Marx and Matthews (2000) and Lockwood and Thomas (2002).
15The undercore generally contains some but not all efﬁcient proﬁles. Deﬁne the core, C; to
be the set of proﬁles that are not blocked, where a proﬁle x is blocked by a coalition S if and only
if a proﬁle z exists such that z￿S D 0 and uS.z/ > uS.x/:18 As N blocks inefﬁcient proﬁles,
core proﬁles are efﬁcient. The following proposition shows that the core consists precisely of
the efﬁcient proﬁles in the undercore.
Proposition 1. The core is the subset of proﬁles in the undercore that are efﬁcient:
C D fx 2 D : x is efﬁcientg:
In a binary setting, straightforward arguments show that the core is the entire set of efﬁcient
individually rational proﬁles:
C D fx 2 Rn
C : X D X￿; xi ￿ Vi for all i 2 Ng:
The undercore differs only by containing the origin: D D C [ f0g: Thus, in a binary setting
with discounting, much of the undercore may be unachievable. Recall that in Example 1, just
one proﬁle is achievable when ￿ < 1; but the entire undercore is achievable when ￿ D 1.
We end this section with a characterization of the core and undercore in neoclassical set-





plays a central role. Since each vi is strictly concave increasing, (3) implies that fS has a unique
maximizer, which we denote as YS: Note that for any coalitions S and T ￿ S; YT ￿ YS; and
YT < YS if YS > 0: (But for convenience, set Y? :D 1:/ Letting N Y :D maxi Yfig; the concavity
of each vi implies that x is a satiation proﬁle if and only if X ￿ N Y.
The value of a coalition S is V.S/ :D fS.YS/: For any proﬁle x; let XS :D
P
i2S xi: The
following familiar proposition states that a proﬁle is in the core if and only if the sum of payoffs
it gives any coalition is no less than its value – what it could obtain “on its own”. (Its proof may
be less familiar because of the x ￿ 0 constraint.)




vi.X/ ￿ XS ￿ V.S/: (13)
18This is a typical deﬁnintion of the core in public good settings, e.g., Foley (1970).
16Roughly speaking, a coalition S cannot underblock a satiation proﬁle x if either it cannot
block it, or if X is sufﬁciently small that S can not block it using any z ￿ x: This intuition is
formalized in the ﬁrst part of the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In a neoclassical setting, the undercore is the set of satiation proﬁles satisfying,
for all coalitions S;
X < YS or
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ XS ￿ V.S/: (14)









For a given aggregate X; the inequalities in (15) impose upper bounds on each coalition’s
contribution. That is, an undercore proﬁle must not require any coalition to contribute too much.
The inequalities determining the undercore are less restrictive for proﬁles with smaller ag-
gregates. For example, (14) implies that if x is a satiation proﬁle satisfying X < YS for every
non-singleton coalition, then x 2 D if and only if it is individually rational. However, if
X D YN; and so X ￿ YS for all coalitions, then (14) implies that x 2 D if and only if it
satisﬁes (13) for all coalitions. The core is therefore fx 2 D : X D YNg:
The followingcorollary impliesthat ina neoclassicalsetting, theaggregate ofany undercore
proﬁle x is no greater than the amount that maximizes the surplus of the contributing coalition,
N.x/ :D fi 2 N : xi > 0g: As YN.x/ ￿ YN; this implies that the core is the northeast surface of
the undercore. Part .ii/ of the corollary, which will be used in the next section, establishes that
the undercore contains a particular line segment of strictly positive proﬁles.
Corollary 1. In a neoclassical setting,







2 D for any Y 2 [ N Y;YN].
Figure 1 (a) illustrates a two-person example of the core and undercore in a neoclassical
setting. In this example N Y D 0; so that all proﬁles are satiation proﬁles. Note that the set u.D/
of undercore payoffs is the entire set of feasible individually rational payoffs.
This is not generally true. Figure 2 depicts a two-person neoclassical setting in which
Yf2g > Yf1g D 0: The undercore does not include individually rational proﬁles like the indicated
x because they are not satiation proﬁles. Such a proﬁle cannot be achieved for any ￿ ￿ 1
because, once a proﬁle sufﬁciently close to x is reached, player 2 would deviate by raising the
aggregate up to Yf2g > X: The payoff u.x/ is not also generated by any undercore proﬁle.
17x2
x1










In the following numerical example, the undercore payoffs are again a strict subset of the
feasible individually rational payoffs. The core payoffs are a strict subset of the individually
rational efﬁcient payoffs. This is generally the case when there are more than two players.
Example 4. Let n D 3 and vi.X/ D 2
p
X: The optimal coalitional contributions are then
Yfig D 1; Yfi;jg D 4; and YN D 9: The satiation proﬁles are those with X ￿ 1; and the set of
individually rational proﬁles is R D fx 2 R3
C : xi ￿ 2
p
X ￿ 1g: The undercore is the union of
two sets, D D D1 [ D2; where
D1 D fx 2 R : 1 ￿ X ￿ 4g;
D2 D fx 2 R : 4 < X ￿ 9; xi C x j ￿ 4
p
X ￿ 4g:
The set of undercore payoffs is u.D/ D u.D1/ [ u.D2/; where
u.D1/ D
￿
Q u 2 R3 : 5 ￿
P





Q u 2 R3 : 8 <
P
Q ui ￿ 9; 4 ￿ Q ui C Q u j; 1 ￿ Q ui
￿
:
Observe that u.D/ is a strict subset of the set of individually rational payoffs that arise from
satiation proﬁles,
￿
Q u 2 R3 : 5 ￿
P
Q ui ￿ 9; 1 ￿ Q ui
￿
:
The core consists of the undercore proﬁles for which X D 9; which can be written as
C D
￿
x 2 R3 : X D 9; 1 ￿ xi ￿ 5
￿
: Note that the set of core payoffs,
u.C/ D
￿
Q u 2 R3 :
P
Q ui D 9; 1 ￿ Q ui ￿ 5
￿
;
is a strict subset of the individually rational efﬁcient payoffs,
￿
Q u 2 R3 :
P




The main result of this section is that under certain conditions in a neoclassical setting, almost
any undercore proﬁle is achievable if the discount factor is close enough to one. Note that some
restriction of the setting is required, as the result is untrue in general. Recall that only one of the
continuum of undercore proﬁles in Example 1 is achievable if ￿ < 1, but they are all achievable
if ￿ D 1:
Sufﬁcient Conditions for Equilibrium Paths
The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd a condition under which (7) is sufﬁcient as well as necessary for a path
to be an equilibrium path. This will be useful because it allows the analysis to focus on paths,
which are much simpler than strategies.
Recall that (7) requires, for i 2 Nt; that the continuation payoff Ut
i .E x;￿/ from not deviating




￿i/. Thus, if E x satisﬁes (7), player i will not
want to deviate from the path at date t if the strategies that will then be played give her a




￿i/. This is the case if deviations trigger the
passive strategies.19 The strategy proﬁle in which E x is played and any deviation triggers the
passive strategies is therefore an equilibrium that generates E x; provided that the passive strategy
proﬁle is itself an equilibrium of any subgame. This is true if (and only if) every proﬁle is a
satiation proﬁle. Accordingly, (7) is a sufﬁcient condition for E x to be an equilibrium path if the
following “Prisoners’ Dilemma” property holds:20
(PD) u￿ D u:
Commonly assumed, (PD) implies that each player’s dominant strategy in any stage game is to
not raise her contribution. The following lemma records the result just proved.
Lemma 5. If u satisﬁes (PD), then for any ￿ 2 .0;1]; a feasible E x is an equilibrium path of





i .E x;￿/ for all t ￿ 1; i 2 Nt: (16)
19If player i unilaterally deviates from E x at date t to some zi ￿ xt￿1
i ; and this triggers the passive strategy proﬁle,
her contiuation payoff will be ui.zi;xt




20Equivalent to (PD) is the property that each ui is nonincreasing in xi: Note too that (PD) implies the absence
of thresholds, i.e., f and hence u are continuous. In a neoclassical setting, (PD) is equivalent to v0
i.0/ ￿ 1 for all
i 2 N; since each vi is concave.
19Remark 2. In the no-discounting case, (PD) in Lemma 5 can be weakened to the assumption
that u is continuous. This is established by Theorem 1 of Gale (2001). The key step in proving
this is to show that when ￿ D 1; any subgame starting from any proﬁle x has, for any player i;
an equilibrium giving player i her security payoff u￿
i .x/: These maximally punishing equilibria
can then be used instead of the passive strategies to prove the sufﬁciency of (7). It is an open
question how much (PD) can be weakened in Lemma 5 when ￿ < 1:
Due to discounting, one more mild assumption shall be made. Discounting implies that
rewards and punishments can inﬂuence current behavior only if they are not delayed too long.
Hence, the interval between the times at which a player can move should not grow too quickly
as the game progresses. This is ensured if the move structure E N satisﬁes a cyclicity property:
(CY) integer m > 0 exists such that i 2 N.nkCi/m for all i 2 N and k ￿ 0:
This property speciﬁes that player 1 is able to move at date m; player 2 at date 2m; and so on
until the pattern repeats with player 1 able to move at date .n C 1/m: There are no restrictions
on who else can move at dates that are multiples of m; nor on who can move at any other date.
Familiar move structures satisfy (CY). With m D 1; it is satisﬁed by both the simultaneous
move structure and the round-robin structure deﬁned by
N R
t :D ft modn C 1g for all t ￿ 1:
The following lemma establishes that if E N satisﬁes (CY), then any equilibrium path of the
round-robin game passes through the same proﬁles as does an equilibrium path of a game that
has the move structure E N and a certain larger discount factor. This result will allow attention to
be restricted to the round-robin structure.
Lemma 6. Supposeu satisﬁes (PD), E N satisﬁes (CY),and E x isanequilibriumpathof0.￿; E N R/
for some ￿ 2 .0;1]: Then 0.￿1=m; E N/ has an equilibrium path E z that passes through the same
proﬁles as does E x:
The path E z in Lemma 6 is obtained by slowing down the round-robin path E x: player 1 moves
in period m instead of period 1; player 2 moves in period 2m instead of period 2; and so on.
Property (CY) insures that this new path is feasible for E N: Along this new path the future reward
a player receives for raising her contribution in the current period is postponed, but raising the
discount factor to ￿1=m increases its present value enough to restore incentives.
20Sufﬁcient Conditions for Achievability
Before presenting the sufﬁciency result for the discounting case, it is useful to consider the
analogous result obtained by Gale (2001) for the no-discounting case. Deﬁne a proﬁle x to be
strongly minimal if there does not exist a coalition S and a proﬁle z < x such that z￿S D 0 and
u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.x/.21 Then, let D0 be the set of satiation proﬁles that are strongly minimal. For a
continuous u; Gale’s result (Lemma 5 and Theorem 1) is that any strictly positive proﬁle in D0
is achievable in the no-discounting case.
The set D0 of strongly minimal satiation proﬁles plays a role in the discounting case as well.
Observe that its deﬁnition is nearly the same as that of the undercore. Since any underblocked
satiation proﬁle is not strongly minimal, D0 ￿ D is always true. In most settings of interest, D
is in fact the closure of D0; so that the two sets are essentially the same. This is true in both the
binary and, as the next lemma implies, neoclassical settings.22
Lemma 7. In a neoclassical setting, c‘
￿
x 2 D0 : X < YN.x/
￿
D D:
The following proposition is the central result of this section. It establishes that if (PD)
and (CY) hold in a neoclassical setting, then essentially any proﬁle in D0 is achievable for all
￿ < 1 sufﬁciently large. Furthermore, the same equilibrium path achieves the proﬁle for all
large discount factors.
Proposition 4. For any neoclassical setting satisfying (PD) and E N satisfying (CY), suppose
x 2 D0 satisﬁes X < YN.x/: Then there exists a path E x converging to x; and a discount factor
￿ < 1; such that E x is an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N/ for all ￿ 2 [￿;1]:
Beforediscussingthestructureoftheproofofthisproposition, weﬁrstconsidersomeitsim-
plications for the set of achievable allocations. Denote the set of achievable proﬁles in 0.￿; E N/
as A.￿; E N/; and let
A. E N/ :D c‘
n
x 2 Rn





That is, A. E N/ is the closure of the set of proﬁles that can be achieved for all large discount
factors less than one. The analogous set in the no-discounting case is A1. E N/ :D c‘A.1; E N/:
Both sets are always in the undercore, by Theorem 1. (The result of Gale (2001) also implies
21The deﬁnition in Gale (2001) of strong minimality differs slightly by requiring z 6D 0: It is useful here to allow
the possibility that z D 0; so that any strongly minimal x > 0 is strictly individually rational: u￿.0/ ￿ u.x/:
22It is easy to show that in a binary setting, D0 D .x 2 D : xi < Vi for all i 2 Ng; which implies c‘D0 D D:
21A1. E N/ ￿ D; by Lemma 7.) The reverse inclusions are true under the conditions of Proposition
4, so that the undercore is essentially the set of proﬁles that can be achieved for both ￿ D 1
and for sufﬁciently large ￿ < 1: This is established by the following theorem, which follows
immediately from Theorem 1, Lemma 7, and Proposition 4.
Theorem 3. In a neoclassical setting in which (PD) holds, A. E N/ D A1. E N/ D D for all move
structures E N that satisfy (CY).
Theorem 3 and Proposition 4 have, under their assumptions, three notable economic conse-
quences. The ﬁrst bears on the nature of the efﬁcient proﬁles that can be approximately achieved
if ￿ D 1 or as ￿ ! 1: Since the core is the subset of proﬁles in D that are efﬁcient, an efﬁcient
proﬁle can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core.
The second consequence bears on the issue of gradualism. Under the assumptions of these
results, almost any achievable proﬁle is achieved by the same equilibrium path for all large
discount factors. Now, the time it takes a ﬁxed path to reach any given neighborhood of its
limiting proﬁle becomes negligible as the period length becomes small. Thus, essentially all
achievable proﬁles can be achieved instantaneously in the limit as the period length goes to
zero. Even though (PD) implies that strategic gradualism is necessary in the sense that no
equilibrium path achieves a non-zero proﬁle in a ﬁnite number of periods, there is no real-time
gradualism if the period length is arbitrarily short.
The third consequence bears on the relevance of the move structure. The result that both
A1. E N/ and A. E N/ are equal to the set D; which does not depend on E N; tells us that the set of
proﬁles that can be achieved for either ￿ D 1 or as ￿ ! 1 is independent of the move structure.
Both the simultaneous and round-robin structures, for example, give rise to the same set of
limiting achievable proﬁles. Of course, for a ﬁxed ￿ < 1 the set of achievable proﬁles does
generally depend on the move structure.
We end this section with an overview of the proof of Proposition 4. In light of Lemma 6,
it only needs to be proved for the round-robin structure. Consider a nonzero x 2 D0 satisfying
X < YN.x/: The proof begins by ﬁnding two proﬁles, N x and O x; that satisfy N x < O x < x and
u.N x/ ￿ u.O x/ ￿ u.x/: The proof that these proﬁles exist depends on the assumption X < YN.x/.
Because v is strictly concave, O x can be chosen so that it too is in D0. The proof then has three
steps.
Step 1 consists of the construction of a round-robin path starting at N x and converging to x.
Each player raises her contribution the same proportional amount towards x when it is her turn
to move. The increases are made small enough that u.x/ ￿ u.xt/ is always positive. But this
22difference shrinks to zero so quickly that for all large ￿, player i’s continuation payoff is close
enough to ui.x/ that she is willing to raise her contribution in the current period. This step uses
X < YN.x/ and the concavity of v:
Step 2 uses the fact that O x is strongly minimal. Adapting an argument in Gale (2001), a
ﬁnite, decreasing sequence from N x to the origin is constructed, along which the players’ payoffs
never exceed u.O x/: The ﬁrst proﬁle of the sequence is obtained by lowering the contribution of
player 1 from N x1 as much as possible without allowing her payoff to exceed u1.O x/: The second
proﬁle is then obtained by lowering the contribution of player 2 in the same manner. Continuing
in round-robin fashion yields a decreasing sequence of proﬁles that each generate a payoff no
greater than u.O x/: The sequence converges to some z < x for which ui.z/ D ui.O x/ for any i
such that zi > 0: This implies, since O x is strongly minimal, that z D 0: The convergence occurs
in a ﬁnite number of steps because, once the sequence is close enough to the origin, a player’s
contribution can be lowered all the way to zero without raising her payoff above ui.O x/:
Step 3 puts together the sequences obtained in the previous steps to yield a path E x that
converges to x and is feasible for E N R: For xt ￿ N x; the construction of Step 1 insures that
the remainder of the path is a continuation equilibrium path if ￿ is large. For xt < N x; u.xt/ is
bounded strictly below u.x/; and so again the continuation payoffs from E x exceed any deviation
payoff if ￿ is large. The path E x is thus an equilibrium path for large ￿.
7. Equilibrium Payoffs
The results obtained so far about achievable proﬁles have implications for equilibrium payoffs.
The following corollary is about the limits of sequences of equilibrium payoffs for discount
factors less than one. For a move structure E N, this set of payoffs is
P. E N/ :D c‘
￿
Q u 2 Rn : Q u D U.E x;￿/ for some equilibrium path E x and ￿ 2 .0;1/
￿
:
Ofnaturalinterestaretheefﬁcientpayoffsinthisset, thoseforwhich Q u D u.x/forsomeefﬁcient
proﬁle x:
Corollary 2.
.i/ For any Q u 2 P. E N/; an undercore payoff u0 2 u.D/ exists such that Q u ￿ u0:
.ii/ Any efﬁcient Q u 2 P. E N/ is a core payoff: Q u 2 u.C/:
.iii/ In a neoclassical setting satisfying (PD), P. E N/ contains all undercore (and hence core)
payoffs for all E N satisfying (CY).
23Part .i/ shows that equilibrium payoffs are bounded above by undercore payoffs. This and
the fact that the only efﬁcient undercore proﬁles are core proﬁles implies .ii/, that any efﬁcient
payoff that approximates an equilibrium payoff is a core payoff. Part .iii/ establishes that all
core payoffs are approximate equilibrium payoffs in a neoclassical setting satisfying (PD), if
the move structure is cyclical.
Remark 3. Similar results hold in the no-discounting case. By Theorem 1, any equilibrium
payoff of 0.1; E N/ is in u.D/: Proposition 1 thus implies that any equilibrium payoff that is
efﬁcient is a core payoff. By Theorem 3, u.D/ is equal to the closure of the set of equilibrium
payoffs in a neoclassical setting given (PD) and (CY).
8. Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to describe the achievable proﬁles and equilibrium payoffs of a
range of dynamic contribution games. The central construct was the undercore, a set of proﬁles
determined by the payoff functions independently of the dynamic structure of the game. The
most general result obtained was that for any dynamic contribution game, only proﬁles in this
set are achievable. This theorem has welfare implications: the only efﬁcient payoffs that are
even approximately achievable are the core payoffs. It also has theoretical implications: there
is no folk theorem for this class of games. Lastly, it may have empirical implications: since the
undercore is often readily characterized, whether only undercore proﬁles are achieved should
be testable in the ﬁeld or laboratory.
In the discounting case, generally not all undercore proﬁles are achievable. But in some
settings they are, such as the neoclassical public good settings satisfying the prisoners’ dilemma
property. In these settings, if the move structure is cyclical, the entire undercore is the limit
of the set of achievable proﬁles as the discount factor increases to one. One implication is
that all commonly assumed move structures yield this same set of achievable proﬁles. Another
implication is a lack of gradualism: almost any achievable proﬁle can be approximately reached
arbitrarily quickly as the period length shrinks to zero. One task for the future is to determine
the extent to which these results hold for other payoff functions.
24Appendices
A. Proofs Missing from Section 4
Lemma A1. For each i 2 N and x￿i 2 R
n￿1
C ; program (6), which is
u￿





has a solution. Furthermore, u￿
i .￿;x￿i/ is right continuous.23
Proof. Since O ui is continuous and f is nondecreasing right continuous, ui is upper semicontinu-
ous. Hence, for any positive integer s; ui.￿;x￿i/ has a maximizer on [xi;xiCs]: Thus, assuming
(6) has no solution, an unbounded sequence fxk D .xk




ui.xk/ ￿ ui.xkC1/: By (PS), u j.xk/ ￿ u j.xkC1/ for all j 6D i: This contradicts (BA). Hence, (6)
has a solution.
Now let fxk
i g be a decreasing sequence such that xk




i ;x￿i/ ￿ u￿
i .x/ for each k; and so
limsupu￿
i .xk
i ;x￿i/ ￿ u￿
i .x/:
Let bi.x/ solve (6). The right continuity of f and the continuity of O ui imply that ui.￿;x￿i/ is
right continuous. Hence, if bi.x/ D xi (and so u￿
i .x/ D ui.x//; we have
liminfu￿
i .xk
i ;x￿i/ ￿ liminfui.xk
i ;x￿i/
D limui.xk
i ;x￿i/ D ui.x/ D u￿
i .x/:
The other case to consider is bi.x/ > xi: In this case, for large k; we have zk
i < bi.x/; and so
u￿
i .xk
i ;x￿i/ ￿ ui.bi.x/;x￿i/: Thus,
liminfu￿
i .xk
i ;x￿i/ ￿ ui.bi.x/;x￿i/ D u￿
i .x/:
We conclude that in either case, liminfu￿
i .xk
i ;x￿i/ ￿ u￿
i .x/ ￿ limsupu￿
i .xk
i ;x￿i/; and so
u￿
i .xk
i ;x￿i/ ! u￿
i .x/: ￿
Proof of Lemma 1. Let E x be an equilibrium path, and assume it does not converge. Then, since
it is nondecreasing, it is unbounded. By (BA), i exists such that ui.x1/ > limsups!1 ui.xs/:
Thus, ui has a positive, ﬁnite number of maximizers on the set fxsgs￿0: Let x￿￿1 be the maxi-
mizer with the largest superscript. Then for ￿ < 1 we have
ui.x￿￿1/ ￿ U￿








i is continuous, but we only need its right continuity in xi:
25and for ￿ D 1 we have
ui.x￿￿1/ ￿ U￿






￿i ; in either case (PS) implies ui.x
￿￿1
i ;x￿
￿i/ ￿ ui.x￿￿1/ > U￿
i .E x;￿/:
This contradicts the necessary condition (8). Therefore E x must converge.
Now let x be a proﬁle achieved asymptotically by an equilibrium path E x; so that Xs <
X for all s: Then, f .Xs/ converges to the left-hand limit f .X￿/, and u.xs/ converges to
O u. f .X￿/;x/: For ￿ 2 .0;1] we have
lim
t!1Ut.E x;￿/ D lim
t!1u.xt/ D O u. f .X￿/;x/:
Fix i 2 N and let O xt
i D X ￿ Xt
￿i: If i 2 Nt; then
O ui. f .X/; O xt
i;xt








where the ﬁrst inequality follows from O xt
i > x
t￿1
i ; and the second from (7). Since .O xt
i;xt
￿i/ !
x;takingthelimitalongtheinﬁnitesubsequenceofdatest thatsatisfyi 2 Nt yields O ui. f .X/;x/ ￿
O ui. f .X￿/;x/:Thisimplies f .X/ ￿ f .X￿/;as O ui.￿;x/isastrictlyincreasingfunction. Hence,
since f is nondecreasing, f .X￿/ D f .X/: This proves f is continuous at X; and so x is not a
threshold proﬁle. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. If E x converges to x in a ﬁnite number of periods, (10) holds trivially. If E x
instead converges asymptotically, then by Lemma 1 we know x is not a threshold proﬁle. Since
f is thus continuous at X; and O u is continuous, u is continuous at x: This and the convergence
of E x to x imply (10).
Since E x converges, fxsgs￿0 [ fxg is compact. Because ui is upper semicontinuous, it has
a maximizer in this set. Assume x is not a maximizer. Then, since ui.xs/ ! ui.x/; ui has
a positive, ﬁnite number of maximizers in fxsgs￿0: This implies, by the argument given to
prove Lemma 1, that ￿ exists such that the necessary condition (8) is violated at .i;￿/: This
contradiction proves that x is in fact a maximizer, i.e., ui.xt￿1/ ￿ ui.x/ for all t > 0: This and
(1) or (2) now imply Ut.E x;￿/ ￿ u.x/ for all t > 0:




￿i/ ￿ ui.x/: Fix i 2 N: Let ￿ ￿ t
























￿i/ ￿ ui.x/: ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose x is achievable. The argument in the text proves it is individually
rational. To show that it is a satiation proﬁle, let E x be an equilibrium path that achieves x;
26and ﬁx i 2 N: Let bi maximize ui.￿;x￿i/ on [xi;1/, and choose " > 0: Because ui is right
continuous and has at most a countable number of discontinuities, b0




i .x/ D ui.bi;x￿i/ ￿ ui.b0
i;x￿i/ C 1
2":
As ui is continuous at .b0







i ￿ bi ￿ xi ￿ x
t￿1









Putting the displayed inequalities together yields u￿




￿i/ C " for t ￿ T: Hence,
by Lemma 2, u￿
i .x/ ￿ ui.x/ C ": As this is true for all " > 0; and u￿
i .x/ ￿ ui.x/; we conclude
that u￿
i .x/ D ui.x/: ￿
Proof of Theorem 2. To simplify notation, let uij.x/ :D @ui.x/=@x j: Let x￿ be an efﬁcient
proﬁle. Then it maximizes u1.x/ subject to x 2 Rn
C and u j.x/ ￿ u j.x￿/ for j > 1: By the
Fritz John Theorem, multipliers .￿;￿/ 2 R2n
C nf0g exist such that
P
i ￿iuij.x￿/ C ￿ j D 0 for all
j 2 N. If some ￿j D 0; then
P
i6Dj ￿iuij.x￿/C￿ j D 0; which implies .￿;￿/ D 0 since uij > 0
for all i 6D j: This contradiction proves ￿ ￿ 0: Without loss of generality we can assume
each ￿i D 1 (normalize by multiplying each ui by ￿i/: Hence, deﬁning W.x/ :D
P
i ui.x/;
we have Wj.x￿/ D ￿￿ j ￿ 0 for all j 2 N (where Wj D @W=@x j/: We also have u jj.x￿/ D
￿
P
i6Dj uij.x￿/ ￿ ￿ j < 0:
Since it is efﬁcient, x￿ 6D 0. Assume it is achieved by an equilibrium path E x: Suppose t > 1






i to obtain a continuation payoff of Ut
i .E x;￿/ D ui.x￿/: But since uii.x￿/ <







such that she could obtain a continuation payoff of at least
ui.xi;x￿
￿i/ > ui.x￿/ by raising her contribution only to xi in period t and subsequently playing
passively. This is contrary to E x being an equilibrium path. We conclude that E x converges
asymptotically to x￿:
































































































Now, let " > 0, and let B be an open ball centered at x￿ such that for any x 2 B and
i; j 2 N;
￿" > uii.x/ and uij.x￿/ C 1
n.1 ￿ ￿/￿￿1" > uij.x/:
(Such a ball exists because each uii.x￿/ < 0 and each uij is continuous.) Since xt ! x￿; date
T ￿ 1 exists such that xs 2 B for all s ￿ T: Choose t > T such that xt￿1 < xt (which can be
done because the convergence is asymptotic). Since each yis is between .x
t￿1
i ;xt
￿i/ and xs; and
both these points are in B; yis 2 B: Accordingly, for all i; j 2 N and s ￿ t; we have
￿ " > uii.yis/ (18)
and, since Wj.x￿/ ￿ 0;
















i ￿ 0 and xs
j ￿ xt



























￿s￿t.Xs ￿ Xt/ ￿ Xt ￿ Xt￿1:
Use the identity .1 ￿ ￿/
P
s￿t ￿s￿t.Xs ￿ Xt/ D ￿
P




￿s￿t.XsC1 ￿ Xs/ ￿ Xt ￿ Xt￿1:
Since the left side of this inequality is a convex combination of terms, one of them must weakly
exceed the right side. That is, t1 > t exists such that Xt1 ￿ Xt1￿1 ￿ Xt ￿ Xt￿1: Since t1 > T;
we can repeat the argument to ﬁnd t2 > t1 such that Xt2 ￿ Xt2￿1 ￿ Xt1 ￿ Xt1￿1: Proceeding
recursively yields a subsequence ftkg such that the differences Xtk ￿ Xtk￿1 are positive (since
Xt ￿ Xt￿1 > 0/ and nondecreasing. This is impossible, since xs ! x￿: The proﬁle x￿ is
therefore not achievable. ￿
B. Proofs Missing from Section 5
Lemma B1. D is closed and bounded.
Proof. Assume D contains an unbounded sequence fxkg1
kD2. Let x1 D 0: Then (BA) implies
that i 2 N exists such that ui.0/ > lim
k!1
supui.xk/: Thus, ui.0/ > ui.xk/ for large k: This
implies xk is not individually rational, i.e., it is underblocked by a singleton coalition. This
contradicts xk 2 D: Hence, D is bounded.
To show that D is closed, let fxkg be a convergent sequence in D; with limit x: We ﬁrst
show that x is a satiation proﬁle. Assume not. Then i 2 N and bi > xi exist such that
ui.bi;x￿i/ > ui.x/: Let O X D bi C X￿i and bk
i D O X ￿ Xk
￿i: Then bk
i ! bi > xi: Thus, for large
k we have bk
i > xk
i : It follows that for large k;
u￿
i .xk/ ￿ ui.bk
i ;xk
￿i/ D O ui. f . O X/;bk
i ;xk
￿i/:
Hence, as O ui is continuous, we have
limsupu￿
i .xk/ ￿ lim O ui. f . O X/;bk
i ;xk
￿i/
D O ui. f . O X/;bi;x￿i/ D ui.bi;x￿i/
> ui.x/ ￿ limsupui.xk/;
where the last inequality holds because ui is upper semicontinuous. This implies that u￿
i .xk/ >
ui.xk/ for large k: This is impossible, since xk 2 D implies that x is a satiation proﬁle. Thus, x
is a satiation proﬁle.
29It remains to show that x is not underblocked, as this will now imply x 2 D. Assume x
is underblocked. Then a coalition S and a proﬁle z ￿ x exist such that z￿i D 0 and u￿
S.z/ ￿
uS.x/: Suppose zi D xi for some i 2 S: Then, since z￿i ￿ x￿i and x is a satiation proﬁle,
u￿
i .z/ D u￿
i .xi;z￿i/ ￿ u￿
i .xi;x￿i/ D ui.x/:
This contradiction implies zS ￿ xS: For any i 2 N we have, since ui is upper semicontinuous,
ui.x/ ￿ lim sup
k!1
ui.xk/:
Hence, for large k we have zS ￿ xk
S; z￿S D 0; and u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.xk/: This implies xk = 2 D for
large k; contrary to the assumption fxkg ￿ D: So x is not underblocked. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. Let x = 2 D: Then a coalition S and proﬁle z exist such that u￿
S.z/ >
uS.x/ and z￿S D 0: For i 2 S; let Q zi ￿ zi solve (6), and set Q z D .Q zS;0￿S/: Then ui.Q z/ ￿
ui.Q zi;z￿i/ D u￿
i .z/ for i 2 S; where the inequality is implied by (PS): Hence, uS.Q z/ > uS.x/:
This proves x = 2 C: We conclude that C ￿ D: Since core proﬁles are efﬁcient, we have C ￿
fx 2 D : x is efﬁcientg:
To prove the reverse, let x 2 D be efﬁcient, and assume x = 2 C: Then .S;z/ exists such that
z￿S D 0 and uS.z/ > uS.x/: Since x 2 D; S does not underblock x using z; and hence
T :D fi 2 S : zi > xig 6D ?:
Let O x :D .zT;x￿T/: By (PS); u￿T.O x/ ￿ u￿T.x/: Hence, since x is efﬁcient, uT.O x/ ￿ uT.x/:
If uT.O x/ D uT.x/; then O x would also be efﬁcient and u.O x/ D u.x/. This is not possible
because of the assumption that distinct efﬁcient proﬁles generate distinct payoffs. We conclude
that for some j 2 T; u j.O x/ < u j.x/: Since z￿T ￿ x￿T; (PS) implies u j.z/ ￿ u j.O x/: Thus,
u j.z/ < u j.x/: This contradicts uS.z/ > uS.x/. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. If S blocks x using z; then summing ui.z/ and ui.x/ over i 2 S yields
P
i2S




since Z D ZS: As the left side of this inequality is no greater than V.S/; this proves that if (13)
holds for all coalitions S; then x 2 C:








30Deﬁne z 2 Rn by z￿S D 0; and zi :D xi ￿ 1 ￿ vi.X/ C vi.YS/ for i 2 S: Then, summing zi
over S yields Z D YS: This implies that O S :D fi 2 S : zi ￿ 0g is nonempty. Deﬁne O z 2 Rn
C by
O zi :D max.0;zi/: Then O z 2 Rn
C and O z￿O S D 0: Because O Z ￿ Z D YS; and O zi D zi for i 2 O S; we
have
vi. O Z/ ￿ O zi ￿ vi.YS/ ￿ zi D vi.X/ ￿ xi C 1 > vi.X/ ￿ xi
for all i 2 O S: Hence, O S blocks x using O z: This contradiction of x 2 C shows that if x 2 C; then
(13) holds for all coalitions S: ￿
Lemma B2. In a neoclassical setting, for any satiation proﬁle x and coalition S that under-
blocks x; a proﬁle z < x exists such that u￿
S.z/ D uS.z/; and S underblocks x using z:
Proof. As S underblocks x; there exists O z ￿ x such that O z￿S D 0 and u￿
S.O z/ ￿ uS.x/: Let
i 2 S be a player such that Yfig ￿ Yfjg for all j 2 S: We can assume O Z < Yfig; as otherwise
u￿





i C Z￿i/ ￿ z0
i D Yfig ￿ Z￿i;
where the second equality holds because vi is strictly concave, v0
i.Yfig/ D 1; and O Z < Yfig:




i .z/ D ui.zi; O z￿i/ D u￿
i .O z/ > ui.x/; and
u￿
j.z/ ￿ u￿
j.O z/ > u j.x/ for all j 2 Snfig;
where the weak inequality holds because u￿ satisﬁes (PS): Hence, u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.x/: It follows,
once we show that z < x; that S underblocks x using z: To prove z < x; observe ﬁrst that
z￿i D O z￿i ￿ x￿i: For i we have ui.z/ > ui.x/I hence, since Z D Yfig;
zi ￿ xi < vi.Yfig/ ￿ vi.X/ ￿ 0;
since Yfig ￿ X (as x is a satiation proﬁle). Thus, z < x: ￿










Proof. Suppose x is underblocked by S: By Lemma B2, z < x exists such that z￿S D 0 and
uS.x/ ￿ uS.z/: Summing these inequalities over S and using ZS D Z yields
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ XS < fS.Z/: (21)
31Thisand Z ￿ X imply Z < XS:As fS.Z/ ￿ V.S/;(21)alsoimplies XS >
P
i2S vi.X/￿V.S/;
which is half of (20). To show the other half, XS > YS; assume the opposite. Hence, Z < XS ￿
YS: Since fS is strictly increasing on [0;YS]; this implies fS.Z/ < fS.XS/:But from XS ￿ X
and (21) we obtain fS.XS/ < fS.Z/: This contradiction proves XS > YS:
To prove the converse, suppose (20) holds for coalition S. From this we obtain vS.X/ ￿








Deﬁne z 2 Rn by z￿S D 0; and zi :D xi ￿ 1 ￿ vi.X/ C vi.YS/ for i 2 S: Then zS ￿ xS:
Summing zi over S yields Z D YS: As YS ￿ 0, this implies that O S :D fi 2 S : zi ￿ 0g is
nonempty. Deﬁne O z 2 Rn
C by O zi :D max.0;zi/: Then O z 2 Rn
C; O z￿O S D 0; and O z < x: For i 2 O S
we have
vi. O Z/ ￿ O zi ￿ vi.YS/ ￿ zi D vi.X/ ￿ xi C 1 > vi.X/ ￿ xi
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from O Z ￿ Z D YS and O zi D zi: This proves that O S underblocks
x using O z: ￿
ProofofProposition3. If x 2 D;then x isasatiationproﬁle. As x isnotunderblocked, Lemma
B3 implies that (20) is not satisﬁed for any S; i.e., (15) is satisﬁed for every S: Conversely, if x
is a satiation proﬁle satisfying (15) for all S; then (20) is not satisﬁed for any S: Hence, Lemma
B3 implies x is not underblocked, and so x 2 D:
If .x; S/ satisﬁes (14), it obviously satisﬁes (15), since XS ￿ X: Suppose then that .x; S/
satisﬁes (15). If YS >
P




i2S vi.X/, which implies
YS > X and so (14). If instead YS ￿
P
i2S vi.X/￿V.S/; then (15) implies XS ￿
P
i2S vi.X/￿
V.S/; and so (14). This proves that (14) and (15) are equivalent. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1. .i/ Let x 2 D: The convention Y? D 1 implies the result trivially if
x D 0: So suppose x 6D 0; and let S D N.x/: Since x 2 D, (14) holds for .x; S/: Hence, since
X D XS;
X < YS or
P
i2S
vi.X/ ￿ X ￿ V.S/:
This implies, if X > YS; that fS.X/ ￿ V.S/ D fS.YS/; contrary to YS being the unique
maximizer of fS: We thus have X ￿ YS:










we have X D Y: Since Y ￿ N Y; x is a satiation proﬁle. To show that x 2 D; we let S be a
coalition and verify that (15) holds. To do this, we can assume XS > YS; and show from this
32that XS ￿
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ V.S/: As each vi is concave, we have
P
i2S


























i.YN/ ￿ XS ￿ YS:
These three displayed inequalities together yield
P
i2S
[vi.X/ ￿ vi.YS/] ￿ XS ￿ YS;
which rearranges to the desired XS ￿
P
i2S vi.X/ ￿ V.S/. ￿
C. Proofs Missing from Section 6
Proof of Lemma 6. Deﬁne E z by letting the players move as in E x; but only at dates that are
multiples of m: That is, let zt D 0 for t D 0;:::;m ￿ 1; and for t ￿ m let zt D xnkCi; where k
and i are the unique integers satisfying k ￿ 0; i 2 N; and
.nk C i/m ￿ t < .nk C i C 1/m:
In E z player i moves only at dates .nk Ci/m; since in E x she moves only at dates nk Ci: The path
E z is feasible for E N by (CY), since i 2 N.nkCi/m: Since E x is an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N R/, it
achieves some proﬁle x by Lemma 1). Thus, E z also converges to x. We use Lemma 5 to prove
that E z is an equilibrium path of 0.￿1=m; E N/:
Consider ﬁrst the case ￿ D 1: Fix i 2 N and t ￿ 1: Since E x is an equilibrium path of
0.1; E N R/; from (9) we have Ut
i .E x;1/ D ui.x/: The derivation of E z therefore implies Ut
i .E z;1/ D
ui.x/: The construction of E z implies that ￿ exists such that .z
t￿1
i ;zt











ui.x/: We thus have ui.z
t￿1
i ;zt
￿i/ ￿ ui.x/ D Ut
i .E z;1/: Now Lemma 5 implies E z is an equilib-
rium path of 0.1; E N/:
We now turn to the case ￿ < 1; and let O ￿ D ￿1=m: Fix t ￿ 1 and i 2 Nt: By Lemma 5, E z is










33which we now show. If zs
i D z
t￿1
i for all s ￿ t; then (PS) implies (22). So suppose a date ￿ ￿ t





i : This date is a multiple of m; say ￿ D pm: Furthermore,
z￿ D x p and z￿￿1 D zt￿1 D x p￿1: Observe that













￿i/ C O ￿
￿￿t











￿i/ C O ￿
￿￿t












￿i/ for each s ￿ t by (PS): Hence, (22) holds if









which we now show. The deﬁnitions of E z and O ￿ imply




















































Putting the two previous displays together yields












where the second inequality follows from (PS) and z￿
￿i ￿ zt
￿i: This proves (23). ￿
Proof of Lemma 7. Let x￿ 2 D: Then X￿ 2 [ N Y;YN]; by Corollary 1 .i/ and the fact that x￿ is
a satiation proﬁle. Our deﬁnition of a neoclassical setting implies N Y < YN: Choose a number O X
as follows:
(a) If X￿ D YN; choose O X 2
￿ N Y;YN
￿
so that for all coalitions S 6D N; O X > YS:
(b) If X￿ < YN; choose O X 2 .X￿;YN/ so that for all coalitions S; if O X > YS then X￿ ￿ YS:
34Deﬁne O x by O xi :D v0
i.YN/ O X: (Since
P




, Corollary 1 .ii/ implies O x 2 D. Let ￿ 2 .0;1/ and x D ￿x￿ C .1 ￿ ￿/O x: Then
X D ￿X￿ C .1 ￿ ￿/ O X 2 . N Y;YN/: Thus, x is a satiation proﬁle, and its aggregate satisﬁes
O X < YN D YN.x/. We now show x is strongly minimal. Since x ! x￿ as ￿ ! 1; this will
prove x￿ 2 c‘
￿
x 2 D0 : X < YN.x/
￿
:
Assume x is not strongly minimal. Then a coalition S and proﬁle z < x exist such that
z￿S D 0anduS.x/ ￿ u￿
S.z/:Since x isasatiationproﬁle, theargumentusedtoproveLemmaB2
shows that we can ﬁnd such a z such that u￿
S.z/ D uS.z/: Using this z; we have uS.x/ ￿ uS.z/:
Summing these inequalities over S yields
P
i2S




vi.X/ ￿ XS ￿ V.S/: (25)
Because XS ￿ X; (24) also implies fS.X/ ￿ fS.Z/: This, since Z < X and fS is strictly
increasing on [0;YS]; implies
X > YS: (26)
This proves S 6D N; since X < YN: The remainder of the proof depends on the case.
Case (a). In this case X￿ D YN > YS: Furthermore, since S 6D N; the way O X was chosen




S ￿ V.S/ and
P
i2S
vi. O X/ ￿ O XS ￿ V.S/: (27)
Now, since each vi is strictly concave, ￿ 2 .0;1/; and O X 6D X￿; we have
P
i2S









.1 ￿ ￿/ O XS C ￿X￿
S
i














This and (27) imply
P
i2S vi .X/ ￿ XS > V.S/; contrary to (25). So x is strongly minimal.
Case (b). In this case O X > X, and so (26) implies O X > YS: This and the way O X was chosen
imply X￿ ￿ YS: The fact that O X > YS and O x 2 D again imply the second inequality in (27).








vi.YS/ ￿ YS C X￿ ￿ X￿
S
D V.S/ C X￿ ￿ X￿
S ￿ V.S/:
35So (27) again holds, and the remaining proof is the same as in case (a). ￿
The following lemma will be used to prove Proposition 4.
Lemma C1. In a neoclassical setting satisfying (PD), for any x 2 D0; a neighborhood of x
exists such that every O x in it that satisﬁes O x < x is also in D0:
Proof. Assume the lemma is false. Then an inﬁnite sequence fxkg exists such that xk ! x;
xk < x; and xk = 2 D0: Since (PD) implies each xk is a satiation proﬁle, each xk must not
be strongly minimal. Thus, for each k a coalition Sk and a proﬁle zk < xk exist such that
zk
￿Sk D 0 and u￿
Sk.zk/ ￿ uS.xk/: By taking a subsequence we may assume N.xk/ D N.x/
and Sk D S for all k, and that fzkg converges to a proﬁle z (as each zk is in the compact set
[0;x]n/: Taking k ! 1 in the inequalities zk < x and u￿
S.zk/ ￿ uS.xk/ yields z ￿ x and
u￿
S.z/ ￿ uS.x/: Since zk
￿S D 0 for all k; z￿S D 0: Therefore, since x is strongly minimal, it
must not be true that z < x: Hence, z D x: This implies N.x/ ￿ S: Since N.xk/ D N.x/;
we have Xk
S D Xk: Because u￿
Sk.zk/ ￿ uS.xk/; (PD) implies uS.zk/ ￿ uS.xk/: Summing these
inequalities over S yields fS.Zk/ ￿ fS.Xk/: Thus, since fS is strictly increasing on [0;YS] and
Xk < X ￿ YN.x/ ￿ YS; we conclude that Zk ￿ Xk: This contradicts zk < xk: ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Observe ﬁrst that once we ﬁnd ￿ 2 .0;1/ and an equilibrium path of
0.￿; E N/ that converges to x; then E x is also an equilibrium path of 0.1; E N/: For, by Lemma 2,








￿i/ ￿ ui.x/ D Ut.E x;1/:
Thus, E x is an equilibrium path of 0.1; E N/ by Lemma 5.
Accordingly, we only need to ﬁnd a path E x that converges to x and a number ￿ < 1 such
that E x is an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N/ for all ￿ 2 [￿;1/: By Lemma 6, it sufﬁces to prove this
for E N D E N R: If x D 0 we are done, since (PD) implies that the passive strategy proﬁle is an
equilibrium that achieves the origin. So we can assume x > 0: Deﬁne d 2 Rn
C by di :D 0 if







for i 2 N.x/:
Since X < YN.x/; we have
P
j2N.x/ v0
j.X/ > 1: Hence, 0 < di < v0
i.X/ for i 2 N.x/: Choose
N ￿ > 0 small enough that N x :D x ￿ N ￿d ￿ 0: Since x is strongly minimal, Lemma C1 implies the
existence of O ￿ 2 .0; N ￿/ such that O x :D x ￿ O ￿d is strongly minimal. We have 0 ￿ N x < O x < x:
We also have u.N x/ ￿ u.O x/ ￿ u.x/; since the concavity of each vi implies that for any ￿ ￿ 0;
@ui.x ￿ ￿d/=@￿ D di ￿ v0
i.X ￿ ￿/ ￿ di ￿ v0
i.X/ < 0:
36Deﬁne fxtg1




￿i : The rest of the proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. A discount factor ￿0 < 1 and a nondecreasing round-robin sequence fxtg1
tD0 exist such








for all ￿ 2 .￿0;1/; t > 0; and i D t .modn/:
Proof of Step 1. Since di < v0
i.X/ for all i 2 N.x/; and di D 0 for i = 2 N.x/; we can ﬁnd




< a < 1 (29)
for all i 2 N: Deﬁne fxtg1














tD0 is a round-robin sequence that starts at N x and converges to x: Fix t > 0; and let
i D t .modn/: Let q ￿ 0 be the integer for which t D i C qn: At the end of period t ￿ 1;
players j D 1;:::;i ￿ 1 have raised their actions q C 1 times, and players j D i;:::;n have







x j ￿ N ￿aqC1dj for 1 ￿ j < i
x j ￿ N ￿aqdj for i ￿ j ￿ n:
(31)
This implies


















x j ￿ N ￿aqCkdj for 1 ￿ j ￿ i
x j ￿ N ￿aqCk￿1dj for i < j ￿ n;
(33)
and



































Each Ak is a sum over n consecutive dates, and player i moves only at the ﬁrst one, t C.k￿1/n.
Hence, for each of these dates s; xs
i D x
tC.k￿1/n









































where the inequality follows from Xs ￿ XtC.k￿1/n for s ￿ tC.k￿1/n: Using now the concavity



















This expression can be bounded from below. From (32) and (34) we have































From this, 1 ￿ ak > a.1 ￿ ak￿1/; and 1 ￿ ak￿1 > a.1 ￿ ak￿1/, we obtain














D N ￿aqC1.1 ￿ ak￿1/:




i D N ￿aq ￿
1 ￿ ak￿
di: Consequently,












This and (29) imply









































.1 C " ￿ a/
￿
:
Thus, A ￿ 0 for ￿ ￿ ￿0 :D .1 C "/￿1=n: As ￿0 does not depend on t; Step 1 is proved. ￿
Step 2. A ﬁnite, nonincreasing round-robin sequence fxkgK
kD0 exists such that x0 D N x; xK D 0;
and u.xk/ ￿ u.O x/ for each k D 0;:::; K:
Proof of Step 2. Let x0 :D N x: To deﬁne x1; let x1
￿1 D x0
￿1: Let x1
1 D 0 if u1.0;x0
￿1/ ￿ u1.O x/:
Otherwise, let x1
1 be the Q x1 for which u1.Q x1;x0
￿1/ D u1.O x/I this equation has a unique solution,
and it is in the interval .0;x0
1/; since u1.￿;x0
￿1/ is monotonic and u1.x0/ < u1.O x/ < u1.0;x0
￿1/:
Note that 0 ￿ x1 ￿ x0; u1.x1/ ￿ u1.O x/; and u j.x1/ < u j.O x/ for j 6D 1:
Now suppose that for some k ￿ 1; proﬁles x0;:::;xk have been deﬁned, and they satisfy







￿1/ ￿ ui.O x/: Otherwise, let x
kC1





for which ui.Q xi;xk
￿i/ D
ui.O x/: We now have u.xkC1/ ￿ u.O x/:
This deﬁnes a nonincreasing and bounded round-robin sequence fxkg1
kD0: Let z be its limit.
We have z ￿ xk for all k > 0; and u.z/ ￿ u.O x/:
Assume z > 0. In addition, assume ui.z/ < ui.O x/ for some i 2 N.z/: By continuity,
Q xi 2 .0;zi/ exists such that ui.Q xi;z￿i/ < ui.O x/: Since xk ! z; there exists k0 such that
ui.Q xi;xk
￿i/ < ui.O x/ for all k > k0: But then, the construction of the sequence implies that for
any k > k0 such that i D k C 1 .modn/; x
kC1
i < Q xi < zi: This contradicts zi ￿ x
kC1
i : Thus,
ui.z/ D ui.O x/ for all i 2 N.z/: Since z < O x and (PD) holds, we conclude that O x is not strongly
minimal. This contradiction proves that in fact, z D 0:
If ui.0/ ￿ ui.O x/; then O x would not be strongly minimal (let S D fig and z D 0 in
the deﬁnition). Hence, u.0/ ￿ u.O x/: Since xk ! 0; this implies that K0 exists such that
ui.0;xk
￿i/ < u.O x/ for all k ￿ K0 and i 2 N: The construction of the sequence thus implies the
existence of K ￿ K0 C n such that xK D 0: ￿
Step 3. A discount factor ￿ < 1 and a path E x ! x exist such that E x is an equilibrium path of
0.￿; E N R/ for ￿ 2 [￿;1/:
Proof of Step 3. Reverse the round-robin sequence obtained in Step 2, and add enough copies
of 0 to its beginning and N x to its end to obtain a ﬁnite, nondecreasing round-robin path. This
39yields a path, fztgT
tD0, from z0 D 0 to zT D N x; that has player 1 moving ﬁrst and player n moving
last .z
T￿1
￿n D N x￿n/: To the end of of this path add the round-robin sequence obtained in Step 1:
zTCs D xs for all integers s ￿ 0: This yields a path E z D fztg1
tD0 that is feasible for E N R and
converges to x: To be notationally consistent, relabel it as E x :D E z:
Let t ￿ 1 and i 2 N R





i .E x;￿/: (35)
If t ￿ T; then since xt
￿i D x
t￿1




￿i/ D ui.xt￿1/ ￿ ui.O x/ < ui.x/:
Therefore, since Ut
i .E x;￿/ ! ui.x/ as ￿ ! 1; ￿t < 1 exists such that (35) holds for ￿ > ￿t: We
conclude that (35) holds for all t ￿ 1; i 2 N R
t ; and ￿ > ￿ :D max.￿0;￿1;:::;￿T/. Lemma 5
now implies that E x is an equilibrium path of 0.￿; E N R/ for all ￿ 2 .￿;1/: ￿
D. Proofs Missing from Section 7
Proof of Corollary 2.
.i/Let Q u 2 P. E N/:ThensequencesfE xkgandf￿kg ￿ .0;1/existsuchthat E xk isanequilibrium
path of 0.￿k; E N/; and U.E xk;￿k/ ! Q u: For each k; let xk be the proﬁle achieved by path E xk:
Fix i 2 N: By Lemma 2, Ui.E xk;￿k/ ￿ ui.xk/: By Theorem 1, xk 2 D: By Lemma B1, D
is compact. Hence, taking a subsequence if necessary, we can assume fxkg converges to some
x 2 D: We now have
Q u D lim
k!1
Ui.E xk;￿k/ ￿ lim sup
k!1
ui.xk/ ￿ ui.x/;
where the last inequality holds because ui is upper semicontinuous at x: Thus, letting u0 D u.x/;
we have Q u ￿ u0 2 u.D/:
.ii/ Suppose Q u 2 P. E N/ is efﬁcient. Then an efﬁcient Q x exists such that Q u D u.Q x/: By .i/;
x 2 D exists such that u.Q x/ ￿ u.x/: Now the efﬁciency of Q x implies x is also efﬁcient, and so
Q u D u.Q x/ D u.x/. As x 2 D; Proposition 1 implies x 2 C: This proves that Q u 2 u.C/.
.iii/ Let x 2 D0: By Proposition 4, ￿ < 1 and E x exist such that E x is an equilibrium path
converging to x for all ￿ > ￿: Hence, U.E x;￿/ 2 P. E N/ for all ￿ > ￿: This implies, since P. E N/
is a closed set and lim￿!1U.E x;￿/ D u.x/; that u.x/ 2 P. E N/: Thus,
u.D0/ ￿ P. E N/: (36)
40Since u is continuous in a neoclassical setting, and D0 is dense in D (Lemma 7), and D is
compact (Lemma B1), we have c‘u.D0/ D u.c‘D0/ D u.D/: Taking closures of both sides of
(36) now yields u.D/ ￿ P. E N/; since P. E N/ is closed. This and C ￿ D imply u.C/ ￿ P. E N/:
￿
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